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Abstract 
 
I consider a model in which an autocrat can be removed from power either through a 
military coup or a revolution by the citizens. In the event of a revolt by the citizens, the 
military may choose to support the autocrat to crush the revolt or play a passive role. The 
autocrat determines the distribution of the country's wealth among himself, the military, 
and the citizens. I find that, under certain conditions, there exists a unique Markov perfect 
equilibrium in which there are no coups, the citizens revolt in each period, and the 
military fights on behalf of the autocrat. Under a different set of conditions, there is 
another Markov perfect equilibrium in which there are no coups, the citizens always 
revolt, but the military does not fight the revolt. However, peace (no revolts) is also an 
equilibrium of the model. The model is consistent with the persistence of social unrest or 
civil wars in certain countries and the different roles played by the military in different 
countries. Surprisingly, I find that if the citizens' outside option (i.e., payoff in a 
democracy) improves, this is likely to make them worse off. Furthermore, an increase in 
natural resources is likely to make the citizens worse off because it reduces the 
probability of a transition to democracy or the prospect of good governance in autocracy. 
I discuss other implications of the model and relate it to real-world events. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a recent article, Besley and Robinson (2010, p. 656) observed that “[T]he 
influence of the military has been greatly ignored by economists. Most work on 
democracy and dictatorship … has abstracted from the role of the military.” In contrast, 
the study of the military in the affairs of the state has a long tradition in political science 
(e.g., Finer, 1976; Luckham, 1974; Nordlinger, 1977; Rouquie, 1987; and Stepan, 1974). 
History is, of course, replete with examples of the role of the military or the army 
in supporting autocrats like Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, 
Kim Jun-il of North Korea, Bashar al-Assad of Syria, and Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo. 
While there are several instances of military coups, there are also instances in which the 
military had no interest in removing autocrats from power. This may be due to the fact 
that the military’s payoff crucially depends or depended on these autocrats being in 
power. For example, removing the autocrat may lead to a chaotic and unpredictable 
succession process.1 Also, the military may extract a surplus from the autocrat which may 
be impossible if the autocrat is not in power. 
It may also be the case that because the citizens can revolt, the military has no 
incentive to remove the autocrat from power because if it did, it will simply accelerate the 
transition to democracy by energizing the citizens to revolt. This may be the case if the 
autocrat and his heirs (family), perhaps because of tradition or a long period of 
                                                 
1 In a related context, a recent article in the New York Times reported that "As Zimbabwe hurtles into 
another violent political season, President Robert Mugabe’s party is fiercely pushing for a quick election 
this year because of fears that the president’s health and vigor are rapidly ebbing, senior party officials said. 
With no credible successor to unite the quarrelsome factions that threaten to splinter the party, its officials 
say they need Mr. Mugabe, who at 87 has been in power for 31 years, to campaign for yet another five-year 
term while he still has the strength for a rematch against his established rival, Prime Minister Morgan 
Tsvangirai, 59. ... Mr. Tsvangirai said of his still dominant partner, “He left the succession way too late, 
and now there is a scramble between the two main factions of ZANU-PF.” (The New York Times, April 
11, 2011). 
 2
indoctrination, have an aura around them which carries a relatively bigger weight than the 
aura around the military.2 Hence, the probability that the citizens will revolt is lower 
when the autocrat is in power than when the military is in power. Or it may be pointless 
to remove the autocrat from power because the citizens will agitate for democracy 
regardless of who is in power.3 In this case, it is in the interest of the military and the 
autocrat to present a united front in order to fight the citizens. Hence, the military and the 
autocrat are the ruling class facing a common enemy.  
Of course, the military may be secured enough to feel that it can get rid of an 
autocrat, hold on to power, and be better off. For example, Acemoglu, Ticchi, and 
Vindigni (2010a) correctly argue that this is a risk to a ruling class of building a strong 
military and refer to this risk as political moral hazard. Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 
(2010a, 2010b) and Besley and Robinson (2010) note that while a strong military can 
entrench an autocrat in power, the political moral hazard mentioned above implies that 
this is only possible if the autocrat compensates the military appropriately through the 
payment of an efficiency wage. Therefore, a stronger military can extract a bigger surplus  
than a weaker military. 4  
 In this paper, I consider a model in which an autocrat can be removed from power 
either through a military coup or through a revolution by the citizens. In equilibrium, the 
military rationally chooses to keep the autocrat in power because it is given enough 
                                                 
2 For example, this aura may be the reason why the North Korean military allowed twenty-eight year old, 
Kim Jun-on, to be the head of state and commander of the armed forces after his father, Kim Jun-il, passed 
away. 
3 This is consistent with Gallego and Pitchik (2004) who found that an increase in the probability that a  
coup-maker loses access to power after a coup implies a decrease in the equilibrium probability of a coup. 
4 In Acemoglu et al. (2010b), the autocrat builds a small army and thereby allows a “citizens” rebellion to 
persist. In Besley and Robinson's (2010) two-period model, the autocrat pays an efficiency wage if he can 
commit to such a wage in period 2. If he cannot commit to such a wage, then he builds a small military in 
order to prevent a coup. 
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transfer to satisfy the no-coup constraint.  There is also a loyalty constraint  which is 
associated with the military's decision to support the autocrat in the event of a revolt by 
the citizens of the country. This support is costly to the military. 
 I find that, under certain conditions, there exists a unique Markov perfect 
equilibrium in which there are no coups, the citizens revolt in each period, 5 and the 
military fights on behalf of the autocrat (the loyalty constraint is satisfied). Under a 
different set of conditions, there is another equilibrium in which the autocrat satisfies the 
no-coup constraint, the citizens always revolt, but the military does not fight the revolt 
(the autocrat rationally violates the loyalty constraint). Under certain conditions, there is 
no equilibrium in which the autocrat is willing to give the citizens enough transfers to 
prevent a revolt. Therefore, the citizens revolt so long as the autocrat is in power. This 
may explain the persistence of social unrest and civil wars in certain countries. The result 
that the loyalty constraint is satisfied in some equilibria but is violated in others is 
consistent with fact that the military plays different roles in different societies. 
 I also find that an increase in natural resources is likely to make the citizens worse 
off because it makes it more likely that the equilibrium in which the military supports the 
autocrat to fight revolts by the citizens will be the outcome of the game. Therefore, 
natural resources reduce the probability of a transition to democracy. Surprisingly, an 
increase in the value of the citizens' outside option (i.e., payoff in a democracy) is likely 
to make the citizens worse off. This is because an increase in the value of the citizens' 
outside option worsens the military's outside option (i.e., payoff in a democracy). This 
makes it relatively cheaper to buy the military's loyalty.  
                                                 
5 As in, for example, Acemoglu et al. (2010b), this may be understood as a persistent civil war, although 
there is a positive (exogenous) probability in each period that the civil war may end. This occurs when the 
citizens overthrow the autocrat. 
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 In contrast to the aforementioned result in Acemoglu et al. (2010a, 2010b) and 
Besley and Robinson (2010), I also find that there exists an equilibrium in which the 
autocrat increases (decreases) transfers to the military when the military is weaker 
(stronger) although the military has become less (more) important to the autocrat’s 
political survival. If the autocrat can choose the strength of military, he chooses a strong 
military. I also argue that the composition of military spending may be as important as 
aggregate military spending.  
 Regarding the result that a weaker (stronger) military can extract a bigger 
(smaller) surplus from an autocrat, a key assumption is the presence of a rebellious  
citizenry or a high threat of rebellion, 6  and the need to incentivize the military to support 
the autocrat. This does not mean that a stronger military is not paid well. In this 
equilibrium, the military is paid an efficiency wage to incentivize it to support the 
autocrat during a citizens' revolt.  Because of a rebellious citizenry, the results of this 
paper differ from Acemoglu et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Besley and Robinson (2010). In 
Acemoglu et al. (2010a), the military can choose not to repress citizens in which case, 
with an exogenous probability, there is a movement to transitional democracy. However, 
the citizens in their model are passive because their behavior is not explicitly modeled 
(i.e., they do not revolt). In Acemoglu et al. (2010b), the initial state in the model is one 
in which a revolt (rebellion) is already under way (i.e., it is exogenous) and revolts cannot 
occur more than once.7 And in Besley and Robinson (2010), there is only an army and a 
civilian government. There are no citizens who can revolt. In my model, the citizens can 
                                                 
6 In the equilibria of this paper, the citizens rebel in every period until they successfully overthrow the 
autocrat.  
7 As they write in footnote 4 "The rebels and the citizens do not play an active role because of our 
simplifying assumptions ..." 
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revolt and their behavior is explicitly modeled.8 Unlike this paper, the focus of these 
papers is not the military’s loyalty in terms of defending an autocrat’s against a revolt by 
citizens. 
As the equilibria of the paper show, it is possible to satisfy the no-coup constraint 
but violate the loyalty constraint. An example was the military’s response to the 
revolution in Egypt in 2011. It was not likely that the military would have actively and 
independently removed Hosni Mubarak from power.9 However, when the millions of 
Egyptian citizens rose up in a revolution, the military chose not to use force to deal with 
the situation. Eventually, Mubarak had to step down when the country became practically 
ungovernable. It is possible that the Egyptian military chose not to act in order to protect 
its rents10 but there are also instances where the military may be worse off when the 
autocrat is no longer in power. 11  
                                                 
8Svolik (2013) is an interesting model that examines the role of the military in politics. In his model, the 
citizens  (i.e., the group excluded from power) is not modeled. The incumbent faces an exogenous threat 
drawn from a known distribution. He obtains an equilibrium in which the military mounts a coup with 
positive probability to oust the leader if the magnitude of the threat is sufficiently high. In contrast, I 
consider equilibria in which the military does not mount a coup because I am interested in examining the 
conditions under which the military will support a leader to fight a citizens’ revolt or stay out of the fight. 
9 One may argue that the military did not actively remove Mubarak from power because it was getting a 
very high surplus from Mubarak. This is not inconsistent with my argument. In fact, as noted above, in the 
equilibrium of this paper, the military is paid an efficiency wage and so it is better off when the autocrat is 
in power. I only use Mubarak's example to underscore the point that a military may choose not to support 
an autocrat in the event of a revolution by the citizens and such apathy may lead to the autocrat's removal 
from power. 
10 A high anticipated cost of fighting the citizens and bringing the situation under control may also have 
informed the military’s decision not to support Mubarak. For example, keeping Mubarak in power was 
increasingly making the country ungovernable; the cost of maintaining law and order while Mubarak held 
onto power became too high. This cost may have, among others, included the loss of the huge transfers of 
aid by the USA to Egypt and the threat of international sanctions. In the formal model, I include a cost to 
the military of fighting a rebellious citizenry. 
11 Besley and Kudamatsu (2009) document instances of the extent to which the power of a selectorate  is 
dependent on an autocrat remaining in office (see also footnote 1). The selectorate is a term due to de 
Mesquita et al. (2003). It refers to the group that a ruler depends on to hold on to power. In a democracy, 
the selectorate is the electorate. In an autocracy, the selectorate may be the military, party cadres, a group 
of allies, or the autocrat’s ethnic group.  
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According to a New York Times article on the 2004 Ukrainian "Orange 
Revolution":  
"... senior intelligence officials ... issued warnings, saying that using force against 
peaceful rallies was illegal and could lead to prosecution and that if ministry troops came 
to Kiev, the army and security services would defend civilians ... Throughout the crisis an 
inside battle was waged by a clique of Ukraine's top intelligence officers, who chose not 
to follow the plan by President Leonid D. Kuchma's administration to pass power to 
Prime Minister Viktor F. Yanukovich, the president's chosen successor." (New York 
Times, January 17, 2005).12 
 
Even in democracies where the opposition does not question the legitimacy of a 
leader’s rise to power, the action of the military is instructive.  For example, since 
November 2013, the military in Thailand has chosen not to intervene in the on-going 
protest of the opposition against the legitimately-elected government of Yingluck 
Shinawatra.  
The paper clarifies the conditions under which an autocrat will buy the loyalty of 
the military in order to get the military to fight on his behalf when the citizens rebel. 
Using Indonesia as an example, Laksmana (2008) puts the political behavior of the 
military into four distinct categories: regime spoiler; critical regime partner; uncritical 
regime partner; and regime pawn. The military is a regime spoiler if it fails to take direct 
orders from the ruling class or uses force against the ruling class. In my model, using 
force is tantamount to a coup and refusing to take direct orders is consistent with not 
fighting a revolt on behalf of the autocrat. However, in equilibrium, no direct orders will 
be refused because the autocrat will not issue orders that he knows will be refused. A 
                                                 
12This citizens' revolution in Ukraine was triggered by allegations of fraud by the incumbent party in favor 
of its candidate in the presidential elections. The nationwide protests succeeded when the results of the 
original run-off were annulled, and a revote was ordered by Ukraine's Supreme Court. Under intense 
scrutiny by domestic and international observers, the revote was declared to be "fair and free". The final 
results showed a clear victory for the opposition candidate, Viktor Yushchenko. He was declared the 
official winner and assumed office on January 23, 2005. 
 7
regime pawn is consistent with the case where the military does not mount a coup and 
always supports the autocrat when there is a citizens' revolt. My model is not rich enough 
to distinguish the role of the military as a "critical regime partner" from its role as a 
"regime spoiler" because I do not give the military or its leader a direct policy-making  
role nor do I allow it to issue verbal dissents.13 The same is true of the category of 
"uncritical regime partner." 
 The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a model to 
demonstrate the result that a weaker military can extract a bigger surplus; a sub-section 
discusses the results. Section 3 extends the model and a subsection discusses how the 
model may be applicable to pseudo-democracies. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The military as a ‘regime pawn’ or a ‘regime spoiler’ 
Consider an infinitely-lived and discrete-time economy made of three risk-neutral 
groups: a civilian ruling class (represented by an autocrat), the military, and the rest of  
the population (hereafter, citizens). 14 A period is indexed by t = 0, 1, 2, …, ∞. Each 
group has a discount factor, δ (0, 1). In each period, the economy is endowed with R > 
0 resources which can be distributed among the three groups. The distribution of this 
resource is determined by the autocrat.   
                                                 
13 Drawing on a distinction between oligarchic (civilian) regimes and military dictatorships in the political 
science literature, Acemoglu et a. (2010a, p. 4) observed that the regimes of President's Alberto Fujimori of 
Peru and Ferdinand Marcos of the Phillipines " ... were backed by the army, but the military establishment 
did not have important decision-making powers." 
14 There are some autocrats who came to power through a military coup but later morphed into civilian 
rulers or remained as military men but their interests diverged from the interests of the military. An 
example of the latter case is the former military leader of Ghana, General Kutu Acheampong. According to  
Hansen and Collins (1980, p. 11), certain elements in the Ghanaian army "... began to look with alarm as he 
(i.e., Acheampong) started to build what looked like a civilian base of support independent from the army." 
Parenthesis mine. 
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If the autocrat is in power, the military has the option of mounting a coup to 
remove the autocrat from power. The citizens of the country also have the option in each 
period to revolt and try to remove him from power. If they revolt but fail to remove him 
from power, they can try again in the next period. Hence the citizens can revolt a multiple 
number of times. If the citizens  revolt, the military (if it did not remove the autocrat from 
power) has two options: (i) support the autocrat (i.e., fight the citizens) or (ii) do not 
support the autocrat (i.e., do not fight the citizens).15 
Let μ > 0 be the per-period cost to the military of fighting a revolution. Without 
loss of generality, assume that the cost to the citizens of a revolt is zero. 16 Also, the cost 
of a coup by the military is zero. Without loss of generality, I assume that in the event of 
a successful coup or a successful revolution, the country becomes a democracy.17 In this 
case, the autocrat’s payoff is zero in the current period and in each subsequent period; the 
military and citizens get B ≥ 0 and R – B  > 0  (respectively) in the current period and in 
each subsequent period.18 A military coup succeeds with certainty (i.e., probability of 
success is equal to 1) while a revolution by the citizens may fail. Therefore, a coup leads 
to a democracy. A coup and a revolution cannot occur at the same time. The military's 
decision to mount a coup precedes the citizens' decision to revolt. Because a coup leads 
                                                 
15As in Acemoglu et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Besley and Robinson (2010), I assume that each group (i.e., the 
citizens, military, and autocrat) has solved the collective-action problem. This assumption has also been 
made in other papers (e.g., Esteban and Ray, 1999). 
16Nothing hinges on this assumption. The cost of a revolt to the citizens can be positive and higher than the 
cost to the military of fighting a revolt. This will not change the results. What matters is that the cost to the 
citizen is not too high. If the citizens' cost of revolt is too high, the solution of the game will be trivial 
because the citizens will play a passive role.  The assumption that the citizens' cost of a revolt is zero (or 
generally, sufficiently small) makes the analysis meaningful because it does not make the citizens passive. 
17I relax this assumption in section 3. The results still hold if we assume that in the event of a military coup, 
the country becomes a military dictatorship with a positive probability which is less than 1.  
18 As will be obvious, the result of this paper holds for B ≥ 0. The military may still receive some payments 
in a democracy because it has to defend the nation and help to maintain law and order.  
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to a democracy,19 there is no need for a revolt when the military mounts a coup. Hence a 
citizens' revolt implies that there was no coup. 
 Conditional on the military supporting the autocrat, let θL(0,1) be the 
probability that if the citizens revolt, they will successfully remove the autocrat from  
power.20,21 Then 1 – θL is the probability that the revolution will fail given that the 
military supported the autocrat. If the military does not support the autocrat, let  
θH   (0,1) be the probability that the revolution will be successful and 1 – θH be the 
probability that the revolution fails, where θH > θL. Note that even if the military does not 
support the autocrat, the revolution may not be successful because the citizens may not be 
well-organized or the autocrat may have other means (e.g., using the police) to fight the 
rebellion.22  
 If the citizens rebel in period t, denote this by rt = 1 and if they do not rebel, 
denote this by rt = 0. If the military supports the autocrat, denote this by st = 1 and if it 
does not support the autocrat, denote this by st = 0. Denote a military coup by mct = 1 and 
no military coup by mct = 0. 
 Denote the autocrat, the military, and the citizens by e, m, and c respectively. All 
groups have the same risk-neutral preferences given by: 
E it
0t
tU

 ,          (1)  
                                                 
19In Acemoglu et al. (2010a), when a coup fails, the country immediately becomes a democracy. 
20I do not endogenize the nature of the contest over power between the citizens and the autocrat/military. 
21Of course, θL depends on the capability or competence of the military. This will be a function of some 
inherent ability of military personnel, the resources available for training, the quality of their weapons and 
intelligence information, and the size of the military.  
22During the 2011 revolt in Egypt, the millions of demonstrators in Tahir square were not armed. 
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where Uit represents the consumption of group i in period t, E is the expectations 
operator, and i {e, m, c}. 
Let Xs,t be the autocrat's transfer to the military in period t if the military chose to 
fight a revolt in period t and let Xns,t be the corresponding transfer if the military chose 
not to fight a revolt in period t. Let Gr,t be the transfer to the citizens in period t if the 
citizens revolted in period t. Let Gnr,t be similarly defined for period t if the citizens did 
not revolt in period t.  
Note that autocrat cannot announce transfers to the military conditional on there 
being a coup because a coup leads to his removal from office.23 The transfers Xs,t  and 
Xns,t which are conditional on whether the military fought a revolt are only relevant if 
there was no coup because a revolt cannot occur when there is a coup. The announced 
transfer, Gr,t, is only relevant if a revolt fails because a successful revolt removes the 
autocrat from office. 
It is important to note that the military plays a special role in this setting: it is the 
only player that can passively or actively decide to either be on the side of the autocrat or 
the side of the citizens by fighting or not fighting a revolt. The other players cannot stand 
on the side of one party against a third party. Note also that from the standpoint of 
revolutions by the citizens, θH – θL > 0 captures the degree to which the autocrat’s grip on 
power depends on the military. It measures the relative importance of the military to the 
survival of the autocrat. The smaller is θH – θL, the less important is the military to the 
autocrat’s political survival. 
 Given that the autocrat is power, the timing of actions in period t is as follows:  
                                                 
23However, we shall make use of the fact that he must give the military a transfer of size B in order to 
prevent a coup. This means that Xns,t  captures the transfer required to prevent a coup where, in this case, 
the military does not mount a coup but does not support the autocrat when there is a revolt. 
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1. The autocrat announces the conditional transfers Xs,t, Xns,t, Gr,t, and Gnr,t.   
2. The military decides to mount a coup (mct = 1) or not (mct = 0). If they mount a 
coup, the country becomes democracy forever. In the current period and in each 
subsequent period, the military gets B while the citizens get R − B. Therefore, the 
autocrat gets a zero payoff in the current period and in all subsequent periods. 
3. If the military does not mount a coup, then the citizens decide whether to revolt (rt 
= 1) or not (rt = 0). If the citizens do not revolt, the game ends in the given period 
and the autocrat disburses the relevant transfers announced in stage 1. The game 
then restarts by going back to stage 1 of period t+1 (i.e., the next period).  
4. If the citizens revolt, the military decides whether to support the autocrat (st = 1) 
or not (st = 0). If the revolt is successful, then in the current period and every 
subsequent period the autocrat gets zero, the military gets B, and the citizens get 
R – B. If the revolt fails, the autocrat disburses the relevant transfers announced in 
stage 1. Then we go back to stage 1 of period t+1. 
 
 For the sake of emphasis, a remark is in order. In the case of a coup, I assume that 
the military receives the same payoff that it will receive in a democracy. As explained in 
section 1, this is because the military is unable to hold on to power after a successful 
coup.  This assumption is relaxed in section 3.2. The results remain unchanged. However, 
this assumption is not unreasonable.  In some cases -- as discussed in section 1 -- the 
fortunes of a selectorate (i.e., the military in this case) are inextricably tied to an autocrat 
being in power. There were indeed autocrats like Gnassingbé Eyadema of Togo, Sekou 
Toure of Guinea, Omar Bongo of Gabon, and Houphouët-Boigny of Cote D'ivoire, who 
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solidified their power and died in office. They were not removed from power by the 
military24 and in some cases, such as Houphouët-Boigny's, their deaths led to very 
chaotic succession processes. One may even argue that the military's dependence on these 
autocrats is evident in the cases of Gnassingbé Eyadema and Omar Bongo where, after 
their deaths, the military ensured that their sons, Faure Eyadema and Ali Bongo, became 
the leaders of their countries. 25 
 
2.1 Equilibrium analysis 
I characterize the pure-strategy Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) of this game. In 
this type of equilibrium, strategies can only be contingent on the payoff-relevant state of 
the world and the prior actions taken within the same period (stage game). 26 So in period 
t, the autocrat does not condition transfers to the citizens on whether they revolted in 
period t-1 or in previous periods. Also, when a revolution fails in period t-1, the transfer 
that the military gets in period t from the autocrat does not depend on whether the 
military supported the autocrat in period t-1 or in previous periods.27 
 Note that the only payoff-relevant states at the beginning of the stage game in 
period t are (a) the autocrat is in power (ND), and (b) the autocrat is not in power (D), 
where D denotes democracy and ND denotes non-democracy. Non-democracy (ND) 
corresponds to a history of no revolution, no coup, or failed revolution(s), and democracy 
(D) corresponds to a history of a military coup or a successful revolution. 
                                                 
24 Initially, some attempted coups were foiled. But after a while in power, no further coups were attempted. 
25 On paper, these countries are democracies. But they are actually pseudo-democracies or de facto 
autocracies. 
26 Unlike subgame perfection, strategies are not based on the entire history of the game. However, an MPE 
is subgame perfect because it is a profile of Markov strategies that yields a Nash equilibrium in every 
proper subgame.  
27I discuss non-Markovian strategies in section 3.3 and show this does not affect the results of this paper.  
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Let t,rP  be the probability that the citizens will revolt in period t conditional on 
the autocrat being in power in period t. Let t,sP  be the probability that the military will 
fight a citizens' revolt in period t and t,ncP  be the probability that it will not mount a coup 
in period t.  
 I look for a Markov perfect equilibrium via backward induction within the stage 
game in some arbitrary period.  I formulate the problem recursively and so drop time 
subscripts.28 If the autocrat is not in power, the game ends and all players get their 
payoffs, as stated, in a democracy.  This case is trivial.  
 Accordingly, start from a subgame in which the autocrat is in power.  
Consider a candidate equilibrium in which the citizens revolt in each period; there are no 
coups; and the military fights a revolt in every period. In particular, 
,0G,BX),1/(BX *r
*
nsL
*
s  0G*nr  , 1PPP *nc*s*r  . I shall show that this is 
indeed a Markov perfect equilibrium.  
 A useful observation is that, holding the transfer to one group fixed, the autocrat’s 
payoff is strictly decreasing in the transfer to the other group (i.e., military or the 
citizens). Hence the autocrat maximizes his payoff by giving each group the minimum 
transfer required to prevent a revolt by the citizens or obtain the support of the military if 
these are his desired objectives. 
Another useful observation is that autocrat will always satisfy the no-coup 
constraint because (1 − θH)(R − B)/(1 − δ(1 − θH)) > 0. The left-hand side of this 
                                                 
28 Given that time is infinite, the only state variable is the resource rent R, and this is constant over time, it 
follows that players will follow stationary strategies in equilibrium. So when the autocrat is in power, he 
will choose the same set of equilibrium transfers in every period, while the military will either always 
support him or never support him and the citizens will always revolt or never revolt. 
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expression is the autocrat’s payoff if he gives B to the military in every period (i.e., 
satisfies the no-coup constraint) but gives nothing to the citizens. 29  The right-hand side 
of this expression is the autocrat’s payoff (i.e., zero) if he does not satisfy the no-coup 
constraint because a coup leads to his removal from power.30  
Starting from stage 4, consider the military's problem when there is a revolt by the 
citizens and, of course, the autocrat is in power. If the military supports the autocrat, the 
value of this action can be written recursively as  
   )1sND(VX)1(1 B)1sND(V msLLm ,     (2) 31  
 Solve )1sND(Vm   from equation (2) to get  


 

 sL
L
L
m X)1(1
B
)1(1
1)1sND(V .          (3) 
 If the military does not support the autocrat, the value of this action is 
 )0sND(VX)1(
1
B)0sND(V mnsHHm 
 .        (4) 
 Solve )0sND(Vm   from equation (4) to get 


 

 nsH
H
H
m X)1(1
B
)1(1
1)0sND(V .         (5) 
The military will support the autocrat if  
)1sND(Vm   ≥ )0sND(Vm  .        (6) 
                                                 
29 To see this, notice if the autocrat gives the military B in each period, he prevents a coup but the military 
will not support him when the citizens revolt. If he gives nothing to the citizens, then the citizens will revolt 
in each period and will be successful with probability, θH. The autocrat's payoff can be written recursively 
as Ω = θH(0) + (1 − θH)(R − B + δΩ). Then solving for Ω  gives the autocrat an expected discounted payoff 
of Ω = (1 − θH)(R − B)/(1 − δ(1 − θH)). 
30Assuming, without loss of generality, that his payoff is zero if he runs away from office, this also means 
that he will not voluntarily run away from office. 
31 Since the military supports the autocrat only when there is a revolt, it is redundant to write  
s = 1 and r = 1.  
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Otherwise, it will not support the autocrat. I refer to the inequality in (6) as the loyalty 
constraint. Given that the no-coup constraint is satisfied, we get BX*ns  . Since the LHS 
of (6) is strictly increasing in Xs and the autocrat's payoff is strictly decreasing in Xs, the 
autocrat chooses Xs to satisfy (6) with strict equality. This gives )1/(BX L
*
s  . 
 Working backwards, now consider the citizens' problem in stage 3. Given that the 
loyalty constraint is satisfied in the candidate equilibrium, if the citizens revolt, the value 
to the citizens can be written recursively as: 
 )1rND(VG)1(
1
)BR()1rND(V crLLc 
 .     (7) 
The autocrat sets *rG  = 0 because he gains nothing by making transfers to citizens who 
revolt. Putting this into (7) and solving gives 
))1(1)(1(
)BR()1rND(V
L
L
c 
 .       (8) 
If the citizens do not revolt, their discounted payoff is:  
 1
G)0rND(V nrc .         (9) 
Then the citizens will not revolt if )1rND(V)0rND(V cc  . This is the no-revolt 
constraint. In the candidate equilibrium, the autocrat violates this constraint, so he 
chooses 0G*nr   and of, course, 0G*r  .  
The problem in stage 2 is trivial since the autocrat satisfies the no-coup constraint 
by choosing BX*ns  . Hence the military does not mount a coup. 
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In stage 1, the autocrat’s value function, given 1PPP *nc
*
s
*
r   and *rG = 0 in 
the candidate equilibrium, can be written recursively as  
)XR)(1()0( sLL  . Solving this recursion, his payoff  is32     
))1(1/()XR)(1( LsL  .       (10)  
Since (10) is decreasing in Xs, it is obvious that the autocrat will choose Xs to satisfy the 
loyalty constraint with strict equality as previously claimed. Therefore, in the candidate 
equilibrium, the autocrat's expected payoff  is  
*
s,r = (1 − θL)(R − *sX )/(1 − δ(1 − θL)) .       (11) 
 It remains to consider possible deviations by the autocrat from the candidate 
equilibrium. Since the autocrat necessarily satisfies the no-coup constraint, we only have 
to consider deviations from the loyalty and no-revolt constraints.  
Suppose the autocrat deviates from the candidate equilibrium by violating the  
loyalty constraint in every period but satisfies the no revolt constraint in every33 period.  
In this case, the autocrat only gives a transfer of B to the military. Then the military will 
not fight a citizens' revolt since fighting a revolt is costly and it will get B even if the 
citizens are successful. To find the transfer to the citizens that is required to satisfy the 
no-revolt constraint, we need to know the citizens' payoff when they revolt conditional on 
the military not putting up a fight. If the citizens revolt while the loyalty constraint is 
violated, the value to the citizens can be written recursively as: 
                                                 
32Obviously, this is the same as the autocrat choosing Xs to maximize (1 − θL)(R − Xs + δΩ) where Ω is 
given by the expression in equation (10). 
33Given Markovian strategies, the autocrat faces a stationary problem each time he contemplates a 
deviation. Hence, considering the deviations above is valid and straightforward. It turns out if there is no 
profitable deviation when such deviations are considered, then the equilibrium also satisfies the one-stage 
deviation principle (e.g., see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). This is to be expected. That is, there is no 
profitable deviation wherein the autocrat deviates in only one period and then reverts to the equilibrium 
play in subsequent periods. Then by the one-stage deviation principle, we have an equilibrium. 
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 )1rND(VG)1(
1
)BR()1rND(V crHHc 
 .     (12) 
It is still optimal for the autocrat to set *rG  = 0. Putting this into (12) and solving gives
 
))1(1)(1(
)BR()1rND(V
H
H
c 
 .       (13) 
Recall that if the citizens do not revolt, their discounted payoff is  1
G)0rND(V nrc . 
Then the citizens will not revolt if )1rND(V)0rND(V cc  . The autocrat maximizes 
his payoff by choosing Gnr such that this constraint holds with strict equality. This gives
  
)1(1
)BR(Gˆ
H
H
nr 
  .         (14) 
Note that nrGˆ  < R − B since θH < 1. The autocrat’s discounted payoff -- when he gives B 
to the military, nrGˆ  to the citizens in each period, and thereby satisfies the no-revolt but 
violates the loyalty constraint -- is  
)1(1
)BR)(1(
1
GˆBR
H
Hnr*
ns,nr 

 .      (15a) 
I assume that * ns,nr
*
s,r  . 
 There is another deviation to consider.  Suppose, in each period, the autocrat 
violates the loyalty constraint and the no-revolt constraint. Then he will give the military 
a transfer of B and nothing to the citizens. Then the autocrat's  expected discounted 
payoff when he does not prevent a revolt and does not satisfy the loyalty constraint is  
*
ns,r = (1 − θH)(R −B )/(1 − δ(1 − θH)).        (15b) 
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Again, I assume that * ns,r
*
s,r  . Notice that * ns,nr* ns,r  . 34 
A final deviation for the autocrat is to satisfy both the loyalty and no-revolt 
constraints. In this case, he will give )1/(BX L
*
s   to the military. Noting that, in 
this case, if the citizens revolt their success probability in each period is L , it is easy to 
show that the citizens will not revolt if the autocrat gives them a minimum transfer of 
)1(1
)BR(G~
L
L
nr 
 . In this case, the autocrat’s payoff is 

1
G~XR~ nr
*
s
s,nr . It can be 
shown that )1)(1)(1/(~ LLLs,nr
*
s,r   > 0. So this deviation is not 
profitable. 
If  * ns,r
*
ns,nr
*
s,r  , then 0G,0G,BX),1/(BX *nr*r*nsL*s  ,35 
1PPP *nc
*
s
*
r   is a Markov perfect equilibrium of the game.  This equilibrium is 
unique. To see this, note that *rG  = 0 is unique because it makes no sense to make any 
transfers to citizens who have revolted. Similarly, given that there is no point in giving 
the military more than B if it does not fight a revolt, BX*ns  is unique. In this sequential 
game, the citizens and military have unique best responses to the actions of previous 
movers in a given period. Since the autocrat, if he is in power, is the first mover in each 
                                                 
34As shown and explained in section 3.1, * ns,nr
*
ns,r   is not a robust result. 
35 Note that *nrG was not used in computing the transfers that satisfy the no-coup and loyalty constraints 
with strict equality. Setting  *nrG = 0 ensures that the no-revolt constraint is violated. It is important to note 
that any nr
*
nr GˆG   will support this equilibrium, so the choice of *nrG  is not unique. In general, all the 
equilibria  stated in this paper are such that the announced transfers associated with out-of-equilibrium 
actions by the military and citizens are not unique. For a given equilibrium, the autocrat's announced 
transfers associated with equilibrium actions are unique and indeed maximize his payoff. Hence the actual 
transfers are unique.  Also, equilibrium actions by the military and citizens are unique. 
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period and *sX  is the unique maximizer of (10), it follows that if 
*
ns,r
*
ns,nr
*
s,r  , 
then 0G,0G,BX),1/(BX *nr
*
r
*
nsL
*
s   is the unique set of optimal values for 
the autocrat's problem.  Therefore, the equilibrium is unique. Accordingly, I state the 
following proposition:  
Proposition 1: Suppose that  * ns,r
*
ns,nr
*
s,r  . Then there exists a unique Markov 
perfect equilibrium in which, conditional on being in power, the autocrat announces the 
transfers, 0G,0G,BX),1/(BX *nr
*
r
*
nsL
*
s   in each period. In each period 
that the autocrat is in power, there are no military coups; the citizens revolt; and the 
military  supports the autocrat (fights the revolt). The autocrat gives the transfer of 
)1/(BX L
*
s    to the military and *rG  = 0 to the citizens in each period.  
Other equilibria exist. To see this, recall that the no-coup constraint is satisfied in 
every equilibrium. Then given that we have shown above that satisfying both the loyalty 
and no-revolt constraints is a dominated strategy, there are only three possibilities to 
consider as equilibria: (1) only the loyalty constraint is satisfied; (2) neither the loyalty 
constraint nor the no-revolt constraint is satisfied, and (3) only the no-revolt constraint is 
satisfied. The autocrat's payoff in the first equilibrium is * s,r . His payoff in the second 
equilibrium is  * ns,r , and his payoff in the third is * ns,nr . Therefore, the following 
proposition holds: 
Proposition 2: Suppose that * s,r
*
ns,nr
*
ns,r  . Then there exists  two  Markov 
perfect equilibria in which, conditional on being in power, (i) the autocrat announces the  
transfers, 0GG,BX,BX *nr
*
r
*
ns
*
s    in each period. In each period that the autocrat 
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is in power, there are no coups; the citizens revolt but the military never tries to crush 
these revolts. The autocrat transfers BX*ns   to the military and *rG  = 0 to the citizens 
in each period, or (ii) the autocrat announces the transfers, 
BX,0G,
)1(1
)BR(G *s
*
r
H
H*
nr 
  BX*ns    in each period. There are no coups and no 
revolts. The autocrat transfers BX*ns   to the military and )1(1
)BR(G
H
H*
nr 
   to the 
citizens in each period. 
 
2.3 Some comparative statics results: (a) natural resources, (b)  the strength of the 
military, and  (c) the citizens' outside option 
 Suppose that there is an increase in R. This is equivalent to an increase in the 
country's wealth (e.g., a discovery of natural resources).  We obtain the following 
derivatives 
)1(1
1
R L
L
*
s,r



 and 
)1(1
1
RR H
H
*
ns,nr
*
ns,r




.36 Then given  
θH > θL, it follows that  

R
*
s,r
RR
*
ns,nr
*
ns,r



. Hence, an increase in natural 
resources or generally an increase in the country's wealth implies that the condition, 
*
ns,nr
*
ns,r
*
s,r  , in proposition 1 is more likely to hold. Note also that the citizens  
worst payoff is in the equilibrium in proposition 1. In both propositions 1 and 2(i), the 
citizens get no transfers from the autocrat but the probability that in a given period their 
revolt will be successful is θL in proposition 1 while in proposition 2(i), this probability is 
                                                 
36 These derivatives assume that a change in R has no effect on B. Relaxing this assumption does not affect 
the results. For example, the result will not change if R and B move in the same direction and the 
proportionate changes are the same. 
 21
θH > θL. Their expected payoff in the equilibrium in proposition 2(ii) is also higher than it 
is in proposition 1 because in proposition 2(ii) because the autocrat gives the citizens a 
transfer, *nrG  > 0. In proposition 2(ii), the probability of a transition to a democracy is 
zero because there are no coups or revolts. But from the citizen’s standpoint, governance 
in this autocracy is better because they get a transfer from the autocrat. This leads to the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 3: An increase in natural resources makes the citizens worse off because it 
makes it more likely that the equilibrium in which the military supports the autocrat to 
fight revolts by the citizens will be the outcome of the game. It therefore reduces the 
probability of a transition to democracy or reduces the prospects of good governance in 
autocracy. 
The result that natural-resource wealth reduces the probability of a transition to 
democracy is confirmed empirically in Ross (2001), Jensen and Wantchekon (2004), 
Ulfelder (2007), Collier and Hoeffler (2009), Alexeev and Conrad (2009) and Tsui 
(2011). This result is theoretically obtained by Acemoglu et al. (2010a), although the 
intuition is different. In their paper, an increase in natural resource wealth increases the 
military's payoff from mounting a coup and so it is more difficult to satisfy the no-coup 
constraint. In my case, an increase in natural resource wealth increases the marginal value 
of the military’s loyalty because, from the autocrat’s standpoint, the military defends a 
more valuable resource and the cost of buying the military's loyalty is independent of R.37 
This implies that the equilibrium in proposition 1 is more likely. 
                                                 
37The result still goes through even if B = βR and so R − B = (1 − β)R, where 0 < β < 1. Then the 
derivatives above will each be multiplied by (1 − β). 
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Now note that 0
)1(1
1
B L
L
*
s,r 


 and   
B
*
ns,r


 = 0
)1(1
1
B H
H
*
ns,nr 


.  In terms of absolute values, 

B
*
s,r
B
*
ns,r


 = 
B
*
ns,nr


 . Therefore, a decrease in B increases * s,r  by a bigger amount than it increases 
*
ns,r  and  * ns,nr . Noting that a decrease in B implies a decrease in the military’s payoff 
in a democracy and an increase in the citizens’ payoff, R – B, in a democracy, we get the 
following proposition: 
Proposition 4: An increase in the citizens' outside option, R − B, makes them  worse off 
because it makes it more likely that the equilibrium in which the military  supports the 
autocrat to fight revolts by the citizens will be the outcome of the game. 
 Proposition 4 is counter-intuitive. Typically, an increase in a player's outside 
option should make him better off not worse off. This is what one expects in two-player 
bargaining or ultimatum games. In this three-player surplus-distribution game, the 
intuition for this paradoxical result is as follows: when R − B increases, this increases the 
value of the citizens' outside option and, from the autocrat’s standpoint, makes it more 
expensive to prevent a revolt. It also means that the value of the military's outside option, 
B, falls. Given that it takes a transfer of )1/(BX L
*
s  to satisfy the loyalty 
constraint, the fall in B makes it cheaper for the autocrat to buy the military’s loyalty and 
this makes the citizens worse off. 
Now consider the effect of an increase in the strength of the military. Ceteris 
paribus, when the citizens' capability to mount a successful revolution increases, this will 
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increase both θL and θH. That is, all things being equal, an increase in the citizen's 
capability should increase their probability of success in any state of the world (i.e., 
military intervention or no military intervention). Therefore, if θH is fixed but θL 
increases, this cannot stem from an increase in the citizens' capability. A higher value of 
θL, when θH is fixed, indicates that the military is weaker since there is a higher 
probability of a successful revolt when the military supports the autocrat but there is no 
change in the citizens' success probability when the military does not support the 
autocrat. In addition, this implies that the military is less important to the autocrat's 
political survival (i.e., θH − θL decreases).  
 It is reasonable to argue that the weaker is the military, the higher is the cost to the 
military of fighting a revolt. Therefore, ∂μ/∂θL > 0. Then holding θH fixed, gives  
0X
1
1X
L
*
s
LL
*
s 





         (16) 
 This gives the following proposition: 
Proposition 5: Suppose that proposition 1 holds. Then the autocrat increases (decreases) 
the transfer, )1/(BX L
*
s  , to the military if the military gets weaker (stronger) 
even though the military has become less (more) important to the autocrat's political 
survival. 
Suppose there is a stage preceding stage 1 (say stage 0) in which the autocrat 
chooses the strength of the military (e.g., size, equipment, training, etc).  And suppose 
that proposition 1 holds. Then the autocrat's problem is: 
L
imizemax

))1(1/())(XR)(1( LL
*
sL
*
s,r  ,    (17) 
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subject to θL [ , θH), where   >  0 is the maximum capability (strength) that the 
military can  have (e.g., it cannot crush a revolt with certainty). Then given the derivative 
in (16), we get   









L
*
s
L
L
*
s
LL
*
s,r X)1(
)1(1
XR
)1(1
1 < 0.    (18) 
Then *L . This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 6: Suppose proposition 1 holds. Then the autocrat chooses the most effective 
military and pays it well enough so that it does not mount a coup and supports him when 
the citizens revolt.  
According to proposition 6, if the autocrat can choose the size or strength of the 
military, then he will choose a very strong military. This is optimal because (i) a stronger 
military requires a smaller transfer, (ii) a stronger military, conditional on being paid 
more than enough to induce it not to mount a coup, will focus its attention on the threat of 
revolts by the citizens, (iii) the military cannot hold onto power after mounting a 
successful coup, and (iv) a stronger military increases the probability that the autocrat 
will stay in power. 
 Of course, other than the cost of direct transfers to the military, the optimization 
problem in (17) does not take into account the cost of military equipment, training, etc. 
This intended to simplify the analysis. Relaxing this assumption will not necessarily 
change the result that the autocrat may prefer to build a stronger military if the 
equilibrium in proposition 1 holds.38 
                                                 
38 Note also that in Acemoglu et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Besley (2010), military expenditure takes the form 
of only monetary transfers (wages) to the military. The cost of military equipment, training, etc is not 
considered. 
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 While the autocrat in Acemoglu et al. (2010b) and Besley and Robinson (2010) 
may build a weak military and thereby allow a rebellion to persist, the autocrat in my 
model could build a strong military and yet a rebellion will persist because the citizens  
are not sufficiently compensated (i.e., *rG  = 0).
39 
 
2.4 Further Discussion 
 Recall that *sX  > B in proposition 1. In fact, given that 0 < θL < 1, it follows that  
*
sX  − μ > B in proposition 1. Hence, in proposition 1, the net transfer to the military in a 
non-democracy (when the autocrat is in power) is higher than the corresponding transfer 
in a democracy (when the autocrat is not in power). Therefore, the military receives an 
efficiency wage. But in this paper, the military is paid an efficiency to induce it to fight a 
revolt by the citizens while in Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2010a, 2010b) and 
Besley and Robinson (2010), the military is paid an efficiency wage so that it does not 
mount a coup. The military's payoff is at its highest level in the equilibrium in 
proposition 1 while the citizens' payoff is at its lowest level in this equilibrium. 
 Intuitively, the autocrat satisfies the loyalty constraint (proposition 1) when θH is 
very high or θL is small, so that * ns,r* s,r   holds. This also makes the relative 
importance of the military, θH − θL, high. When θH is low, then the risk of losing power 
                                                 
39Of course, *rG  = 0 does not literally mean that citizens get nothing. We could say that the country has a 
resource W in each period and the citizens must be guaranteed a minimum transfer of Gmin > 0, where  
R = W − Gmin > 0. Gmin may be a minimum investment in public goods or the component of the resource 
that the citizens can control. Then the analysis goes through by setting *rG  = Gmin > 0, so long as this 
triggers a revolution. 
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through a citizens’ revolt is low and hence the autocrat does not incentivize the military 
to fight revolts, so proposition 2 is likely to hold. 
 Assuming that revolts lead to the destruction of property and lives, one may argue 
that a peaceful equilibrium in which both the no-coup constraint and no-revolt constraints 
are satisfied is more likely. But the historical evidence suggests that in many autocracies 
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America such peaceful equilibria are not that common. A 
peaceful autocracy is likely if the size of the pie in a peaceful autocracy is sufficiently 
bigger than the pie in a democracy or in a non-peaceful autocracy.  
  To figure out the intuition for the result in proposition 5, we note that  *sX  is the 
solution to ∆1 ≡  )1sND(Vm   − )0sND(Vm   = 0. We can differentiate this equation 
at *sX  to get 
s1
Lm
L
*
s
X/
/)1sND(VX


 .       (24) 
Then given L
*
s /X  > 0 in (16) and ∂Δ1/∂Xs > 0, it follows from (24) that 
.0/)1sND(V Lm  Since 0/)0sND(V Lm  , it follows that -- holding θH 
fixed -- when the military is weaker (i.e., θL rises), its payoff from supporting the autocrat 
falls while its payoff from not supporting the autocrat remains unchanged. This means 
that if θL increases and *sX  does not adjust, then Δ1 < 0. Then the military will not 
support the autocrat when the citizens revolt. To incentivize the military to support him, 
the autocrat must increase *sX  when θL rises. Therefore, increasing *sX  is necessary 
because when the military gets weaker, this reduces its expected payoff from supporting 
the autocrat. Similarly, it reduces the expected payoff of not mounting a coup. 
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 When the loyalty constraint is violated as in proposition 2, then the transfer to the 
military is independent of its strength, even if the no-coup constraint binds: 
∂ 0/X L*ns  . So, in this case, proposition 5 does not hold. 
 The analysis suggests that the composition of military spending may be as 
important, if not more important, as aggregate military spending. That is, what percentage 
of military spending goes directly to the welfare of the military (i.e., wages, 
accommodation, allowances, clothing, etc) and what percentage goes into training, 
equipment, etc? It is possible for a utility-maximizing autocrat to preserve incentives by 
increasing the first component of military expenditure and reducing the second; these two 
components of military expenditure may be substitutes for achieving an incentive-
compatible outcome. The military may overlook other reasons (e.g., lower quality 
equipment) to stage a coup when it is being paid enough.  
 On the preceding point, Nordlinger (1977, p. 70) cites the example of President 
Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela, who "... managed to serve out his entire constitutional 
term of office -- the first time this had occurred in that country's military-dominated 
history -- by providing the officers with the best salaries, rapid promotions, and a 
generous allotment of fringe benefits."  Yet between 1912 and 1964 in Peru, "... every 
civilian government that reduced the proportion of the national budget assigned to the 
Peruvian military was overthrown, and this despite the continual increases in the 
absolute size of military expenditures." (Nordlinger, p. 67). This suggests that in addition 
to the proportion of the budget assigned to the Peruvian military, it perhaps cared about 
the composition of military expenditures. And increase in the absolute size was not 
enough. 
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 Besley and Robinson (2010, p. 662) argue that "... institutions which make some 
kinds of promises to the military credible, would allow the possibility of a larger military 
supported by an efficiency wage. This is more likely, all else equal, when there is a 
strong demand for an army due to an external threat."  Proposition 6 shows that external 
threat is not the only reason why a larger military may be built. An internal threat (by 
citizens) to the autocrat's rule and the inability of the military to hold on to power after a 
successful may also lead to a large military. 
 
3. Extensions 
3.1 Changing the autocrat's payoff when he is out of power 
 Recall that the autocrat will always satisfy the no-coup constraint.  In the previous 
section, I assumed that when there is a successful citizens’ revolt, the autocrat got zero in 
the current period and in all subsequent periods. Unlike the previous section, suppose that 
the autocrat gets R – B in the current period and zero thereafter, regardless of whether a 
citizen’s revolt was successful. This is equivalent to an increase in autocrat’s payoff when 
he is overthrown by the citizens after satisfying the no-coup constraint. Then it can be 
shown that: 
)1(1
Rˆ
H
H*
ns,rns,r 
 , and 
)1(1
)BR(ˆ
H
H*
ns,nrns,nr 
 . 
Given that * ns,r = * ns,nr and making the reasonable assumption that B > 0, it follows that 
ns,nrns,r ˆˆ  in this case. This gives the following proposition: 
Proposition 7: Suppose that when the autocrat is overthrown, he has a better outside 
option (in this case, a one-time access to the country's resource).  Then there is no 
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equilibrium in which the autocrat gives transfers to the citizens in order to prevent a 
revolt.  
 It is obvious that we can easily construct the analogue of the equilibrium in 
proposition 2. In this case, the equilibrium outcome is unique because, given proposition 
7, the equilibrium in proposition 2(ii) will not exist. Proposition 7 may explain the 
persistence of social unrest or civil wars in certain countries. A utility-maximizing 
autocrat may allow this state of affairs by choosing not to appease dissenting groups. 
However, the important point the autocrat has a weaker incentive to appease the citizens 
because his payoff when he is overthrown by the citizens is now higher (i.e., the autocrat 
has immediate access to the country’s resources for one period when he is overthrown).  
 As stated earlier, the previous result that * ns,r = * ns,nr  is not robust. To see why 
*
ns,r = * ns,nr , not that in both equilibria in proposition 2, the military does not fight a 
revolt, if it occurs. In the (r,ns) equilibrium, there is always a revolt if the autocrat is in 
power and the autocrat gives no transfers to the citizens. In the (nr,ns) equilibrium, the 
autocrat gives a transfer to the citizens and there is no revolt. So in the (r, ns) equilibrium, 
the autocrat gives a smaller (zero) transfer and faces a higher probability of being 
overthrown whereas in the (nr, ns) equilibrium, the autocrat gives a bigger transfer and 
faces smaller (zero) probability of being overthrown. It turns out that these tradeoffs 
exactly offset each other, which makes the autocrat’s payoffs in proposition 2 equal.  In 
this section, the model was extended to increase the autocrat's payoff when he is 
overthrown. This increased his payoff in the (r,ns) equilibrium leading to the result that 
the payoff in the (r, ns) equilibrium is bigger than the payoff in the (nr,nr) equilibrium: 
ns,nrns,r ˆˆ  . 
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3.2 The coup effect in Acemoglu et al. (2010a, 201b) and Besley and Robinson (2010) 
 In this section assume, as in section 2, that when the autocrat is overthrown, he 
gets a payoff of zero in the current period and in all subsequent periods. 
 In the model, the strength of the military affects its ability to crush a revolt but not 
its ability to remove the autocrat from power. The probability that a coup will be 
successful is 1, regardless of the military's strength. This explains why in proposition 2 
where only the no-coup constraint is satisfied, the strength of the military has no effect on 
the transfers that it receives from the autocrat (i.e., ∂ 0/X L*ns  ). 
 Suppose instead that a military coup is successful with probability p = p(θL), 
where ∂p/∂θL < 0 and 0 < p < 1. So the weaker is the military, the lower is the probability  
that a coup will be successful.40 This is consistent with the formulation in Acemoglu et al.  
(2010a, 2010b) and Besley and Robinson (2010).41  
 In Acemoglu et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Besley and Robinson (2010), when a coup 
is successful, the military can hold on to power and so its payoff will be higher than it 
will be in a democracy. To introduce this effect in the present model, suppose that when a 
coup is successful, the military can hold onto power forever and that this occurs with 
probability α (0,1). In this case, suppose the military gets T (B, R) in every period 
when a coup is successful. With probability 1 − α, the country becomes a permanent 
democracy after a successful coup and the military gets B in every period. The military's 
ability to hold on to power after a successful coup should be higher if it is stronger. So 
                                                 
40Recall that a higher θL means that the military is weaker. 
41 Note that in Besley and Robinson (2010), the cost of mounting a coup is smaller when the military is 
stronger (i.e., has a bigger size). In Acemoglu et al. (2010a, 2010b), a weak military (i.e., of small size) 
cannot mount a coup, so has zero probability of success while a strong military (i.e., large size) can mount a 
coup and is successful with positive probability. These assumptions are analytically equivalent to the 
assumption that the probability of a successful coup is higher when the military is stronger. 
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assume that ∂α/∂θL < 0. As in Acemoglu et al. (2010a), suppose that after a failed coup, 
the country becomes a democracy forever. 
 The model in this section has two effects: (a) the effect identified in Acemoglu et 
al. (2010a, 2010b) and Besley and Robinson (2010) where a stronger military has a 
greater capacity for a coup and therefore can extract a bigger surplus, and (b) the effect 
identified in this paper which stems from the need to incentivize the military to fight an 
active and rebellious citizenry. 
 The preceding assumptions imply that regardless of whether a coup fails or 
succeeds, either democracy or military rule becomes an absorbing state. Therefore, as 
before, given that a coup precedes a revolution, once a coup takes place, a revolution 
cannot occur. And a coup, regardless of whether it fails or succeeds, leads to the removal 
of the autocrat from power. In this case, it can be shown that in the analogue of the 
equilibrium in proposition 1 holds and that proposition 5 continues to hold.42 Therefore, 
the assumption that the military cannot hold onto power after a coup is not crucial. 
 
3.3 Remarks on (a) pseudo-democracy and (b) subgame perfection 
 The model described in this paper is applicable to pseudo-democracies  (e.g., 
Robert Mugabe's  Zimbabwe; Gnassingbe Eyadema’s Togo; and Paul Biya’s Cameroun) 
where the incumbent can use the military and other law-enforcement agencies to rig 
elections. In this case, θL is the probability that the citizens can vote an incumbent leader 
out of office conditional on the incumbent receiving the support of the military and other 
law-enforcement agencies to rig the election. Then θH is the probability that the citizens 
can vote the incumbent out of office if he does not receive the support of the military to 
                                                 
42The analysis is straightforward and is available on request. 
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rig the election.43 As before, the military can remove the leader from office through a 
coup. Then proposition 1 and its analogue in section 3 is consistent with pseudo-
democracies in which there are no coups and the incumbent rigs every election with the 
help of the military and other law enforcement agencies while proposition 2 is the case in 
which the autocrat does not receive the support of the military.   
 The equilibria in this paper hold even if the players use non-Markovian strategies. 
To see this, consider the model in section 2. The autocrat cannot punish the military if 
they mount a coup. So he must give them, at least, B to prevent a coup. When the citizens 
revolt and fail, he imposes the maximum punishment (i.e., zero transfer) on them in the 
current period. Suppose instead that if the citizens revolt in period t, he threatens to 
impose a much harsher punishment by giving them a zero transfer in period t and beyond 
regardless of whether they revolt or not revolt in period t+1 and beyond. But he cannot do 
better with this strategy than his payoff in the equilibria in section 2 because given 
0G*r  , the citizens' continuation value of revolting, given by the recursive equation in 
(7), remains unchanged. Also, the military cannot impose a harsher punishment on the 
autocrat than removing him from office if he gives it a transfer less than B. Finally, the 
citizens cannot do better than revolting if the autocrat gives them less than nrGˆ . The 
same arguments hold for the equilibria in section 3. 
 Since the military can remove the autocrat from power at no cost, and the autocrat 
gets a positive amount of the surplus, R, the citizens and military can be better off if they 
can collude. In this case, the military removes the autocrat from power and since  
                                                 
43Without the military, the leader can still use other law enforcement agencies like the police to the rig the 
elections. 
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 B + *rG < R, there exists a distribution of the surplus that will make the citizens and the 
military better off relative to their equilibrium payoffs. But this collusion is not possible 
because the citizens cannot commit to not insisting on getting R − B after democracy 
becomes an absorbing state. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Autocrats who have been in power for a long time (e.g., 20 or more years) are 
rarely removed from power by the military. This could be due to the fact that they 
managed to foil previous coups and this solidified their grip on power. But it could also 
be the case that their longevity makes it difficult for the military to believe that it can 
hold the country together after a successful coup. In such cases, it takes a citizens' 
rebellion or a civil war to remove such autocrats. But the success of a citizens' revolt 
depends on whether the military will fight on the autocrat's behalf. This paper has proven 
a number of results and demonstrated different equilibria under which the military may or 
may not support an autocrat. To revisit the terminology in Laksmana (2008), the paper, 
among others, clarifies the conditions under which the military will be a regime spoiler or 
a regime pawn and the conditions under which the citizens will be worst off. 
One can think of several extensions to this paper. One could relax the assumption 
that the military does not have any internal dissent. For example, there could be factions 
of the military which support the autocrat because of ethnicity or other reasons. Modeling 
the incentives of different factions in the military will be an interesting extension. A 
challenging extension is to allow stochastic shocks to the parameters of the model after  
the autocrat has committed to his transfers. 
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